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ANTHROPOLOGY OF IMMANUEL KANT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY A. E. KROEGER.

PART FIRST.—ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIDACTIC.

Concerning the Manner in which to cognize the Internal as well as the External of Man.

BOOK FIRST.—CONCERNING THE POWER OF COGNITION.

§ 45. *Mental Diversion (distractio)* is the condition of a turning off of attention (*abstractio*) from certain dominant representations, by distributing them among others of a dissimilar kind. If it occurs purposely, it is called *dissipation*; if involuntary, it is termed *absence of mind (absentia)*.

One of the weaknesses of the human mind is this: to be nailed to some representation or another to which we have applied great or permanent attention, and from which we are now not able to relieve ourselves—that is, not able to again make our power of imagination free. When this defect becomes a habit, and is always directed to one and the same object, it may turn into insanity. To be absent-minded in society is *impolite*, frequently also ridiculous. Women are generally subject to this infirmity, unless they have turned their attention to study. A servant who is absent-minded when attending at the table has generally something evil in his mind—either some evil of which he fears the consequences, or some evil which he purposed to do.

But to *divert our mind*—that is, to give a diversion to our involuntary reproductive power of imagination—for instance, when a clergyman, having finished his memorized sermon, desires to prevent its afterward haunting his mind—this is a necessary, and in part also artificial, proceeding for the taking care of the health of our minds. A protracted pondering upon one and the same object leaves behind an echo, as it were, even as the music of a dance, if long continued, still keeps humming in the ears of those who return from their revels; or as in the case of children who incessantly repeat one and the same *bon mot* of their fancy, especially if it sounds rhythmical—an echo, which annoys the mind and can be stopped only by diverting and directing the attention to other objects, such, for instance, as the reading of newspapers.

The *regathering* of our faculties (*collectio animi*), so as to be prepared for every new business, is a restoration of the balance of power of our mental forces, which promotes the health of the mind. Social entertainments and amusements of varied character are, like games, the most wholesome means for this purpose. But such entertainments must not skip abruptly from one thing to another against the natural association of ideas; for, in that case, the social party disperses in a condition of distraction of mind—the hundredth being mixed with the thousandth, unity of conversation lacking altogether, and the mind thus finding itself utterly confused and in need of a new diversion wherewith to disperse the former.

From this it appears that there must be an art (not a common art) for busy people to diet their minds in order to gain new strength. But when we have gathered our thoughts together—that is, have prepared ourselves to do with them as it pleases us—we cannot, on that account, call any one who intentionally gives way to his thoughts in an improper place, or improperly in his business relations to another person—taking no notice of such place or relations—distrait, but only absent-minded, to be which in *society* is certainly impolite.

Hence it is not a common art to divert ourselves without ever becoming *distrait*, which latter condition, if it become habitual, gives to the man subject to this infirmity the appearance of a dreamer and makes him useless for society, since he follows his own imagination in its free play, uncontrolled by reason.

The *reading of novels*¹ has—among many other disturbances of the mind—also this result: that it makes a habit of mental diversion. For, although by sketching characters, which can actually be found among men (though they be somewhat exaggerated), it gives a connection to thought, as if the novel were a real history—which must always be told in a certain *systematic* manner—it nevertheless allows the mind, while reading, to switch off, as it were; that is, to insert still other events as fictions, whereby the mental operation becomes *fragmentary*, and we permit our representations of one and the same object to play in our mind

¹ In these days of cheap novels, and inveterate novel reading, it may be not out of season to direct special attention to this paragraph.—*Tr.*

disjointedly (*sparsim*) and not connectedly (*conjunctionem*), or according to the unity of our understanding. The teacher in the pulpit or in the academic lecture-room, likewise the prosecuting attorney or the lawyer in the court-room, must exhibit *three* kinds of attention: firstly, as to what he *says now*, so that he may express it clearly; secondly, as to what he *has said*; and thirdly, as to what he is *going to say*. For, if he omits to attend to any one of these things—that is, to arrange them in this precise order—he distracts his own mind as well as that of his hearers or readers; and an otherwise good enough mind can, under such circumstances, not escape the charge of being in a state of confusedness.

§ 46. An itself healthy understanding—one that has no mental weaknesses—may, nevertheless, be accompanied with weaknesses in regard to its application, which necessitate either *postponement* until it attains proper ripeness by *growth*, or the being represented by another person in regard to his business matters which are of a civil character. The natural or legal incapacity of an otherwise healthy man to use his *own* understanding in civil affairs is called *Unmuendigkeit*;¹ if it is founded on unripeness of age it is called *minority*; but, if it is founded on legal institutions for the transaction of public business, it may be called the *legal* or *civil Unmuendigkeit*. Children are naturally *unmuendig*, and their parents are their natural guardians. *Married women* are held civilly *unmuendig* at any age, the husband being the natural curator. But it is different when a wife holds property apart from her husband. For, although a woman has, by virtue of the nature of her sex, sufficient mouth-tools to represent herself and her husband before court, so far as talk is concerned, in all cases relative to the mine and thine, and hence might be considered even *uebermuendig*² in this respect, still, as little as it becomes woman's sex to enter the army ranks, even so little does it become her to de-

¹ There is no equivalent for this word in the English language. It means literally “mouthlessness”—that is, without a mouth, a voice, in court, or at the polls. For such a condition, when owing to want of the necessary age, the English language has the word *minority*; but for the other cases it has only roundabout expressions. I have, therefore, thought it best to use the German word.—*Tr.*

² *Uebermuendigkeit* = mouth-superfluity. KANT indulges here in one of his bachelor jokes. He means to say that in money and property matters women have more mouth-tools (tongue, etc.) than enough to take care of themselves and husbands, though the law declares them mouthless—*unmuendig*—even for themselves alone.—*Tr.*

fend her rights in person and carry on legal business for herself. She needs a representative for this purpose ; and this legal *unmuendigkeit* in regard to public transactions gives her all the more power in regard to household affairs, wherein the *right of the weaker party* becomes a factor, to revere and defend which the male sex feels itself bound by its very nature.

Still, however degrading, it is very comfortable to make one's self *unmuendig*—to be under tutelage—and, of course, there is no lack of leaders, who make use of this pliancy of the large masses—that are not like to unite of their own accord—and who know how to represent to them that it is dangerous to use one's *own* understanding without the leadership of another ; nay, that this danger is great, and probably fatal. The head of a State calls himself the *father of his country*, because he knows better than his *subjects* how to make them happy ; but the people are, for their own benefit, condemned to perpetual tutelage ; and when ADAM SMITH says improperly of the rulers, "that they themselves are, without exception, the greatest spendthrifts of all," he is, nevertheless, powerfully refuted by the (wise?) laws regulating luxury passed in many countries.

The *clergy* keep the *laymen* strictly and persistently in their tutelage. The people have no voice and no judgment in regard to the path which they have to take in order to reach heaven. It needs not man's own eyes to reach that place ; they will guide him sure enough ; and though they put holy writings in his hands, so that he may see with his own eyes, he is, at the same time, warned by his leaders "not to find anything else than what they assure him they have already discovered in them." Everywhere the mechanical direction of men under the rule of others is considered the surest means to make them follow a legal order.

Scholars love, as a rule, to remain under the tutelage of their wives in regard to household affairs. A scholar, buried among his books, on hearing a servant cry "There's fire in one of the rooms!" replied : "You know that those matters belong to my wife!"

Finally, a man may become *unmuendig* again after having been *muendig*: for instance, when he has turned out a spendthrift, or when, after having acquired legal majority, he exhibits a weakness of the mind in the administration of his property,

which stamps him a child or idiot. But the consideration of this matter lies beyond the field of anthropology.

§ 47. *Dull (hebes)*, like an unsharpened knife or axe, we call any one whom we cannot teach anything, who is incapable of learning. A person who is capable only of imitating is called a *simpleton*; whereas he who can himself originate products of the mind, or of art, is called a *genius*. Quite different from both is *simplicity*—in opposition to artificiality, of which latter quality we say that “perfect art again becomes nature,” and which quality we attain only at a late period of our lives. This simplicity is a faculty to attain the same object by an economy of means; that is, without circumlocution. He who possesses this gift—the wise man—is, with all his simplicity, not at all a simpleton.

Stupid we call pre-eminently any one who cannot be used for business purposes, because he possesses no power of judgment.

A *fool* is a person who sacrifices things that are valuable to objects that have no value; for instance, his home-happiness to outside show. Foolishness, when it becomes offensive, is called *folly*. You may call a man foolish without offending him; nay, he may confess himself to be a fool; but to be called fool, as signifying to be the tool of knaves (in *Pope's* use of the word), no one can bear quietly.¹

Haughtiness is folly; for, firstly, it is foolish to ask of others that they should esteem themselves little in comparison with me; and hence my requests result only in neglect. But such a request involves also offence, and this effects deserved *hate*. The word *fool*, when applied to a woman, has not that harsh significance, since a man does not believe that he can be offended by the vain presumption of a woman. Hence the word folly seems to be applicable only to the conception of a man's haughtiness.

When we call a person who has injured himself—for time or for all eternity—a fool, and when we thus mix contempt with hatred of him, although he has not offended us, we must consider

¹ When we say to a person in reply to his jokes and tricks: “You have no sense!” this is a somewhat flat expression for “You are joking!” or “Are you not smart?” A smart person is one who judges correctly and practically, but without art. Experience can make a smart man a sensible man—that is, enable him to use his understanding with art, but nature alone can make a man smart.

the offence as one committed against all mankind, and hence as committed against another person. He who acts directly contrary to his own legal advantages is also often called a fool, though he hurts only himself. *Arouet*, the father of VOLTAIRE, told some one who congratulated him on his celebrated sons: "I have two fools for sons; the one is a fool in prose, the other a fool in verse." (One, having embraced Jansenism, was persecuted; and the other had to atone for his satires in the Bastile). As a general thing, the fool places the greater value in *things*, whereas the man of folly places a greater value on himself than he rationally ought to do.

When we call a man a *gawk* or a *fop*, we take as our basis the conception of their *want of sense*, or foolishness. The former is a young, the latter is an old fool. Both are misguided by knaves or rascals; and, though the former still claims pity, the latter draws upon himself only our bitter ridicule. A witty German philosopher and poet expounds the French words *fat* and *sot* (under the generic name of *fou*) as follows: "The former is a young German who goes to see Paris; the latter is the same young man when he returns from Paris."

That total weakness of the mind, which either suffices not even for the animal use of the vital forces (as in the case of *cretins*), or suffices at the utmost for the merely mechanical imitation of external acts, such as even animals can perform—as, for instance, to saw, to dig, etc.—is called *idiocy*, and cannot well be called a disease of the mind, since it is rather an utter deficiency of mind.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN SON.

HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," THIRD PART, "THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION," II, 3.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

3. This requires that we should remember and define what the nature and definition of man is, how it is to be considered, how man ought to consider it, and what he ought to know of himself. Here we arrive at once at

(1.) The two opposite definitions: Man is good by nature; he